Naised saunas räägivad, et osadele Debiani versioonidele saab paigaldada ka Ubuntu pakke. Või kasutada nii-öelda alternatiivset tarkvara (mis küll suures osas on sama lähtekoodiga). Aga see ei kõla nagu päris õige tegu. Kuna tegemist on avatud lähtekoodiga, peaks ju olema võimalik Ubuntu asemel .deb pakke Debiani peal teha ka ametlikust algkoodist?

UUENDATUD 04.01.2012: Töötab ka viimase Ubuntu peal, build-skripti lisatud OpenSC paki ehitamine.

Võtame appi "ID-kaardi baastarkvara pakendusjuhend" dokumendi ja SVN-is oleva lähtekoodi ning ehitame ise Debiani pakid! Järgnevates punktides olevate käskude mõtestatud copy-paste peaks tulemuseks andma paigaldatava ID-kaardi tarkvara.

1. Tiri alla väike patch ja build-skript:

   wget http://martinpaljak.net/ria-debian-hack.tar.gz

2. Paki lahti:

   tar xzvf ria-debian-hack.tar.gz

3. Paki sees on ka väike README-tüüpi fail:

   cd ria-debian-hack
   more README

4. Paigalda ehitamiseks vajalikud pakid:

   sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends subversion doxygen xsdcxx cdbs cmake build-essential libxml2-dev ruby zip rubygems dpkg-dev libssl-dev libp11-dev libpcsclite-dev libldap2-dev libgtk2.0-dev libqt4-dev libxerces-c-dev libxml-security-c-dev libtool autoconf automake

   Squeeze ja amd64 platvormi peal lapi vigane g++-4.4 kompilaator:

   sudo ln -sf /usr/lib/libstdc++.so.6 /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/4.4.5/libstdc++.so

5. Tiri SVN-ist algkood (võtab natuke aega...):

   svn co https://svn.eesti.ee/projektid/idkaart_public/trunk/ idkaart

6. Lisa /etc/apt/sources.list faili ehitatavate pakkide repositoorium:

   sudo sh -c "echo 'deb file://$HOME/repository ./' >> /etc/apt/sources.list"

7. Lapi SVN-is olev kood ja valimistu tarkvara ehitamiseks:

   mkdir -p idkaart/current && ln -s  ../packaging idkaart/current/packaging
   (cd idkaart && patch -p0 < ../debian.diff)

8. Ehita pakid (võtab samuti natuke aega...):

   ./builder.sh

9. Kui kõik lõpeb vigadeta (joru lõpus on "dpkg-scanpackages: info: Wrote 22 entries to output Packages file."), paigalda tarkvara:

   sudo apt-get update
   sudo apt-get install estonianidcard

10. Sina ei tohi himustada oma ligimese naist, sulast, ümmardajat, kariloomi ega midagi muud, mis on tema oma.

Debiani puhul on parem paigaldada OpenSC unstable-st (lisa vastav rida /etc/apt/sources.list faili, tee apt-get update & apt-get install opensc/unstable.

Antud pakid pole küll Debiani vaatenurgast kõige ilusamad (lintian leiab kokku 92 probleemi, millest 36 vead ja ülejäänud hoiatused) aga nad töötavad. amd64 peal saab Google Chrome kaudu peale väikest nikerdamist (kiika README sisse) nii sisse logida kui näiteks mID lepingut allkirjastada. Edaspidise osas peaks abi ja viiteid saama installer.id.ee lehelt.

Head buildimist!

PS. Kõlakad räägivad, et Portugali ID-kaardi avatud lähtekoodiga tarkvara arendajad pakuvad koodist leitud kriitilise vea eest 1000€ ... Go figure...

Kui Sa ei ole veel seda teinud, siis mine pane ennast kirja ja hääleta huvitavate teemade poolt!

Tunned huvi kiipkaartide vastu ja tahaksid lähemalt teada, mida kujutab endast JavaCardide programmeerimine? Mine pane linnuke kirja vastavale teemale, et teaksin ettekandeks valmistuda.

To protect against such attacks, secure PIN entry devices (commonly known as pinpad readers) exist. Such devices are supposed to be with specially designed hardware which guarantee that PIN codes travel directly from the device keypad to the smart card, without passing through the host computer and thus not visible to possibly hostile software on the host computer.

This is a reminder to not be fooled by marketing alone. A device with Hewlett-Packard logo (model KUS0133) claims secure PIN entry and modification capability in the CCID descriptor but in fact does not enforce the secure PIN entry promise - the entered code can be read by host software. This behavior was discovered by accident - the device *seems* to work flawlessly on Linux but have a look what happens on Mac OS X 10.6.6:

mrtn:~ martin$ opensc-tool -l
# Detected readers (pcsc)
Nr.  Card  Features  Name
0    No    PIN pad   HP USB Smart Card Keyboard 00 00
mrtn:~ martin$ pkcs11-tool --login --test --slot 1 --module /Library/OpenSC/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so 
1234

error: PKCS11 function C_Login failed: rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR (0x5)

Small explanation:

• After the keyboard has been connected and identified to Mac OS X, OpenSC detects the reader and the advertised pinpad capability
• Trying to do some operations with the inserted smart card leads to the point where the software sends the correct command to the reader to do a secure PIN entry operation and the "secure PIN entry" led on the keyboard is turned on, signaling that the PIN code should be entered on the numpad of the keyboard. On Linux, keys other than ESC (which cancel the transaction) and ENTER (which confirms the entered PIN) don't work in this mode (nothing appears on the screen at least).
• Now the unexpected happens: the entered PIN ("1234" in this example) is shown on standard input! In fact, all keys work and entry to stdin is possible. The expected output should be the tool showing test results of operations with keys on the card without any keyboard input.

Without further investigation I can guess there are two possibilities of what's going on:

1. It is possible for the host software to set the device firmware to a state where the pinpad is malfunctioning and sends keyboard input to the host
2. The entered PIN code is always transmitted over USB but Linux "correctly" routes those packets to /dev/null

Either way the reader can't be considered as a secure PIN entry device as the host software can affect the functioning of the device and the secure PIN entry mode is not enforced by the keyboard firmware.

What next?

• The next release of OpenSC shall disregard the advertised pinpad capability of this reader and enforce normal (no pinpad) mode
• Probably an upcoming release of the open source CCID driver shall have the pinpad feature disabled already in the driver layer
• The myth that devices that claim to do everything actually do nothing well got reassured. If you are worried about the secrecy of your PIN code, buy a dedicated pinpad reader with tamper evident features (like a hologram sticker and certified firmware)
• Remember to keep your computer up to date with security patches and don't install software or visit websites you don't trust - the best protection against trojans. Also make sure that you remove your smart card from the reader as soon as you have finished using it, to limit the time when hostile software could abuse your connected smart card

1. .pri.ee domeenide jätkuvalt tasuta võimaldamist eraisikutele
2. tasuta või väga mõisliku hinnaga esimest .ee nime Eestis registreeritud ettevõtetele
3. korralikku iseteenindust .ee domeeni haldamiseks (ID-kaart, äriregister, rahvastikuregister jms viisakalt ühendatud, ehk isegi integreeritud DNS haldamine)
4. 300 krooni tükk aastas kõigile teistele soovijatele

• .ee on osake meie rahvuslikust identiteedist, see ei ole ainult kurgid turul.
• Eesti püüab olla e-riik. E-riigi jaoks on internet ja selles toimuv eriti oluline. "Üldlevinud euroopalikud tavad" igal tasandil teeks meist "üldlevinud euroopalikul tasemel" e-riigi mis oleks midagi Hispaania sarnast (loe: heal juhul keskpärane)
• Internet ja .ee on osake riigi poolt pakutavast infrastruktuurist, mida hoitakse käigus maksudega; riik teeb palju utoopilisemaid ja küsitavama rakenduslikkusega e-projekte (e-tervis jmt), samas kui domeeninimede puhul on tegu väga selge ja lihtsa tehnoloogilise lahendusega, umbes nagu rahvastikuregister.
• Vaevalt, et üks andmebaas nõuab enda käigus hoidmiseks 300 krooni aastas ühe kirje hoidmise, töötlemise ja edastamise eest? See teeks rahvastikuregistri käitlemise kuludeks (~1300000 * 300) 390000000 krooni ehk ligi 400 miljonit aastas. Tõesti? Kohustuslik e-teenindus ühekordse investeeringuna ja sellest tulenevalt vähenenud tööjõukulu võiks võtta 5 inimest 20000/kuus + sama palju tehnika peale = 10*40000*12 = ~5 miljonit krooni aastas.
• Sellise mudeli puhul maksavad ületarbijad (squatterid jne) kinni teiste baasvajadused.

• 1 Linuxiga x86 arvuti (Ubuntu 8.10)
• 1 ACR122 RFID lugeja (osta näiteks siit)
• java6, pcscd, ccid tarkvara (sudo apt-get install sun-java6-bin pcscd libccid)
• 1 biomeetriline pass

1. Tiri endale JMRTD (Java MachineReadableTravelDocument) tarkvara aadressilt jmrtd.org (vali platform independent JAR file: jmrtd_installer.jar)
2. Paigalda JMRTD: java -jar Desktop/jmrtd_installer.jar
3. Käivita JMRTD: ~/JMRTD/jmrtd.sh
4. Vali "Add" ja sisesta enda passi number, enda sünnikuupäev ja passi kehtivuse aeg (see on Basic Access Control ehk BAC):
5. Aseta enda pass lugejale ja oota kümmekond sekundit. Passist loetakse kõik andmed, sealhulgas pilt:

• RFID kasutusvõimaluste analüüs ning soovitused eesti ID-kaardi täiendamise kontekstis (via Tanel Tammet)
• KOMISJONI OTSUS, millega nähakse ette liikmesriikides väljaantavate passide ja reisidokumentide turvaelementide ja biomeetria standardeid käsitlevad tehnilised kirjeldused

1. WTF?
2. Kas tõesti?

1. aadressi martin.paljak@gmail.com või selle parooli see ei sisalda
   - seega pani Tõnu 2 ja 2 kokku ja tuletas mu e-maili aadressi õhust
2. sama IP pealt, mis minu arvutil vahepeal oli, käis hiljem keegi tõesti kohaliku ruuteri kallal nagistamas. Aga mitte minu arvuti MAC aadressilt
3. üle õhu liikus skype bonjour broadcast koos minu kasutajanimega martinpaljak
4. üle õhu liikus del.icio.us Firefoxi plugina Cookie koos kasutajanimega martinpaljak
5. üle õhu liikus plaintextis minu twitter.com parool:

• Ära usu kõike mida kuuled. Tihti käib terakese tõega kaasas palju pullikakat.
• Avalik wifi on ohtlik. Kui võimalik, kasuta VPN-i (kui oskad) või Kõud või GSM-i või muud raskemini pealtkuulatavat võrku.
• Ära jooksuta suvalisi internetist leitud programme! Kontrolli eelnevalt nende korrektsust, eriti kui nad internetti kasutavad. Kas tead kellega ja millest Su arvuti omaette räägib?
• OpenID on hea, eriti "suvaliste web2.0 rakenduste" jaoks, et tüdinud kasutajad ei peaks "salakala" paroole kasutama ja selle turvalisuse pärast muretsema.

• Global Trends on Mobile Marketing: Most interesting slides as they had actual and factual information from a survey listing different trends and technologies which are used in marketing. Notice that LBS has a HUGE growth potential ("planning to use in next 12 months vs have used in past 12 months") and that majority of marketeers still rely on messaging. LBS drum has been hammered for years now as The Next Big Thing. But to me it comes with no surprise that iPhone does not have MMS support - it is expensive, cumbersome and mobile/closed (vs web/open) technology apparently invented (read: sucked out from a pencil) only to bring you junkmail. Multimedia exchange between peers feels much more potent via social services running over the (mobile)internet using internet methods (http, e-mail, social sharing services) than via monstrums like MMS. From my ignorant point of view, MMS represents a greedy mockup by operators who hope that it will follow the success of SMS (which, unlike ugly-CORBA-successor-SOAP based MMS, is a neat and clever hack on top of existing GSM network). I hope MMS dies soon.
• Estonian Operators Mobile Advertising Reach Package: Rrrright. After reading "2/3 of mobile internet traffic comes from operator portals" I understood that I've never given much thought to the difference of Mobile Internet and Mobile Broadband. For me mobile broadband internet is just a Pipe going through the Air into some Processing Device. Sometimes the device is attached to a computer, sometimes the processing device itself has input-output and user interaction capabilities and sometimes the broadband comes in sub-GPRS speeds. And operators are fighting hard not to become mere Pipes, hoping they could maintain their walled gardens. I still don't believe that 2/3 of handset browsing only goes to the operator portal, but then again, most people don't use technology the way I do or they don't use it at all. After getting a glimpse of what the global trends are (technology, attitude and the unique right place-time-location mantra) it came a little shocking that the only thing they provide is a way to buy wholesale 'dumb pixel squares' on mobile 'web' portals. No demographics, no advanced features. Nothing. A suggestion to operators who are evaluating their location based services (and advanced marketing) strategies for Mobile *Broadband*. Mix LBS with web technologies such as Gears Geolocation API to give location aware ads and web content to desktop browser. A good (also a bit scary) example was JoikuSpot, which turns your 3G Nokia phone into a WiFi hotspot. The landing page of the hotspot displayed a Google map with the location of your mobile...
• Mobile Marketing Case Studies: There have been moments when I've thought that operators exist only because of football, because different big football events are very often natural stress-tests for mobile messaging technologies - spikes in traffic are guaranteed during New Year and world cup. Life in mobile messaging revolves around football, so did the Snickers campaign launch just hours before an important match. Does some big operator (Vodafone? Telefonica?) already own some FCs? If not, they should!